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Abstract 
The mind has developed vigilance mechanisms that protect individuals from deception and 
misinformation (Sperber et al. 2010). They make up a module that checks the reliability and 
believability of informers and information. Vigilance mechanisms may also comprise a sub-set 
of specialised mechanisms safeguarding hearers from interpretative mistakes conducive to 
misunderstanding by triggering an attitude of hermeneutical vigilance (Padilla Cruz 2014). This 
causes individuals to check the plausibility and acceptability of interpretative hypotheses 
appearing optimally relevant. Relying on empirical evidence, this paper characterises this sub-
set of mechanisms and suggests some avenues for future research. 
Keywords: Relevance theory, epistemic vigilance, hermeneutical vigilance, interpretative 
hypotheses, comprehension 
 
1. The modular mind and comprehension 
Relevance-theoretic pragmatics (Sperber, Wilson 1995; Wilson, Sperber 2004) endorses the 
massive modularity thesis, according to which the mind is a complex system of modules 
(Sperber 1994, 2001, 2005; Carruthers 2006). These are mandatory, deal with a specific type 
of input and perform their tasks very rapidly. Their output is the conceptual representations that 
the mind manipulates. Some modules involved in comprehension are the decoding module, 
which decodes linguistic input; the pragmatic module, which performs various types of 
inferences, and the mindreading module, which attributes mental states like beliefs and/or 
intentions to our interlocutors (Wilson, Sperber 2004). Another module playing a crucial 
function in communication is the social cognition module, which computes information about 
interlocutors’ personal attributes (Wilson 2012). These modules are driven by the search for 
maximum gain in return for minimum allocation of effort and yield interpretative hypotheses 
about speaker’s meaning.  
Interpretative hypotheses are constructed through a process of mutual parallel adjustment of 
the explicit and implicit content of utterances (Carston 2002). Decoding and inference work 
simultaneously when parsing and disambiguating constituents, assigning reference to elements 
like pronouns or deictics, adjusting conceptual material through narrowing or broadening, or 
recovering elided material. These tasks result in the lower-level explicature of an utterance. 
This may be subsequently inserted in a conceptual schema alluding to the action the speaker is 
thought to perform by means of her words and/or to the attitude she is perceived to have towards 
the proposition communicated1. The output of this is the higher-level explicature. Both lower- 
and higher-level explicatures amount to the explicit content of the utterance. This may 
additionally be inferentially related to implicated premises supposed to be necessary in order to 
arrive at the expected implicated conclusions, or the implicit content of the utterance.  
A hearer will only regard a particular interpretative hypothesis as the intended message –i.e. 
the speaker’s informative intention– if he attributes a communicative intention to her –i.e. if he 
really thinks that the speaker intends to communicate that message. However, attributing a 
particular informative and communicative intention to the speaker does not involve that the 
hearer reaches the right interpretation and believes what she says. One thing is to infer a 
particular interpretation and correctly understand an utterance, while another is to give 
credibility to it.  
 
2. Epistemic vigilance 
Hearers are prone to believe information when they perceive their interlocutors as benevolent 
–i.e. sincere, honest– and competent –having a good command of the grammar and norms of 
use of their language (Sperber 1994; Wilson 1999). Empirical evidence reveals that this results 
from the operation of further mechanisms fine-tuned between the ages of two and four, which 
focus on our information sources and the information communicated, thus enabling children 
not to gullibly trust just any kind of information or interlocutor (Clément et al. 2004; Koenig, 
Harris 2007; Corriveau, Harris 2009; Mascaro, Sperber 2009). These mechanisms check the 
reliability and sincerity of communicators and the credibility of the information they give 
(Sperber et al. 2010). Among other relevant data and factors, such mechanisms take into 
account the beliefs about informers accrued from previous encounters (e.g. the degree of 
authority or expertise in specific matters, trustworthiness, etc.); moral commitments 
determining whether one should actually rely on some individuals; the reputation of individuals 
as informers distributed within a social group; signals about the speakers’ competence in or 
knowledge about specific issues (e.g., assertiveness, seeming certainty or conviction, 
difficulties at finding appropriate words, frequent rephrasing, stuttering, hesitation or 
contradictions); speakers’ gaze direction or avoidance of eye contact; the relevance of the 
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 Reference to the speaker is made through the feminine 3rd person singular pronoun, while reference to the hearer 
is made through the masculine counterpart. 
information dispensed or its coherence with information already possessed, or emotional 
reactions that might condition what individuals think about others (e.g. (dis)like, sympathy, 
anger, etc.) (Origgi 2013: 224).  
These mechanisms trigger an attitude of epistemic vigilance (Mascaro, Sperber 2009; Sperber 
et al. 2010): an alertness to the possibility of being deceived that results in a critical stance to 
both informers and the information that they provide (Sperber et al. 2010: 363). In other words, 
epistemic vigilance intervenes in communication by generating a cautious attitude that prevents 
individuals from being blindly, naïvely and uncritically gullible (Sperber et al. 2010; Mercier, 
Sperber 2011; Sperber, Mercier 2012). It moves individuals from a position of indiscriminate 
trust, where they believe information unquestioningly, or another of gullible trust, where they 
even believe information that contradicts previous personal observation, to a position of 
sceptical trust, indispensable for avoiding deception (Clément et al. 2004: 361-363). 
Epistemic vigilance may be activated to varying degrees. The stronger its activation, the more 
deception and/or misinformation is likely to be avoided; the weaker its activation, the more 
individuals run the risk of being deceived and/or misinformed (Michaelian 2013; Sperber 
2013). However, individuals may raise their vigilance and inspect the data and factors listed 
above more closely in order to be aware of the reasons why they should (dis)trust someone or 
some information. When they do so, they exercise active vigilance (Origgi 2013: 224).  
 
3. Active vigilance and interpretation 
Active vigilance involves an awareness of the heuristics deployed while processing –i.e. which 
inferences are made when determining if someone or some information is reliable– and the 
biases that might have affected it –i.e. why one reaches that conclusion. Such awareness must 
be of external factors, like cultural norms conditioning interaction and beliefs about other 
individuals and states of affairs spread throughout a milieu (external vigilance), and of internal 
factors, like moral commitments, personal norms and beliefs about other individuals and 
specific states of affairs, as well as emotional reactions to and biases against them (internal 
vigilance). Since these factors have an impact on what a person thinks about others or how that 
person treats some information, individuals need to distance themselves from the conclusions 
they draw about others and the information they dispense, tracing their origin and assessing the 
potential consequences that believing those conclusions might have. In doing so, individuals 
can reconstruct the inferential steps taken and the beliefs exploited while inferring. This enables 
people to adopt a critical attitude to them, which is essential to separate valid inferences from 
those that manipulation of certain beliefs, norms or biases might have yielded (Origgi 2013: 
226-227). 
Since exercising active vigilance and introspecting enable people to reconstruct their inferences 
when deciding whether to trust certain informers and information, people may also introspect 
and trace the inferential routes they follow when constructing interpretative hypotheses. To put 
it differently, individuals may bring to consciousness how and why they segment, parse and 
disambiguate linguistic material, assign referents, narrow or broaden concepts, recover elided 
material, embed lower-level explicatures under higher-level ones, use some contextual material 
as implicated premises or overlook another, or reach some implicated conclusions.  
 
4. Hermeneutical vigilance 
Children process ambiguous sentences rapidly and effortlessly, and construct good-enough 
meaning representations (Ferreira 2003). Between the ages of three and six, children have 
problems with interpreting, for instance, homophones (Khanna, Boland 2010). Upon suspecting 
misinterpretation, they resort to cues such as lexical information (Norris et al. 2003) in order to 
evaluate the appropriateness of their interpretations, but erroneous interpretations seem to linger 
in their minds (Ferreira et al. 2002)2. Between the ages of six and eleven, children still have 
problems with assigning referents to pronouns, though eye movement tracking reveals that they 
revise initially wrong referents (Engelen et al. 2014). Eye movement also unveils that some 
four- and five-year olds revise interpretations of ambiguous sentences (Choi, Trueswell 2010). 
By the age of eight or nine, children seem to achieve adult-like processing abilities, even if they 
may still hesitate between competing interpretations of some types of sentences or elements 
therein (Lorsbach et al. 1998; Parault et al. 2005; Weighall 2008).  
This suggests that the human mind is sensitive to inadequate interpretations. That sensitivity 
would progressively develop in parallel to the abilities to read other people’s minds and attribute 
beliefs and intentions –essential for understanding, among others, irony (Wilson 2013)– or to 
assign credibility to informers and information (Mascaro, Sperber 2009). The frontal lobes, 
whose neurodevelopment requires time, would be responsible for such sensitivity. One of their 
components, the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG), seems to cope with resolution of some 
conflicts, among which are those of competing interpretations (Milham et al. 2001; Ye, Zhou 
2009). Damage in LIFG correlates with inability to disambiguate garden-path sentences (Norris 
et al. 2003) and underdevelopment of frontal lobes surfaces in processing problems (Woodard 
et al. 2016). 
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 Some five-year olds, in contrast, do not seem to rely on contextual information in order to revise 
misinterpretations. 
Further evidence that humans develop some form of caution against misinterpretation can be 
adduced from the realm of humour. In puns and some jokes, humourists are aware of the 
potential ambivalence of some words or syntactic strings and can somehow anticipate how the 
audience may process them, as well as which contextual information they will use (Yus Ramos 
2008). This enables humourists to cunningly guide and wittingly bias the audience to an 
interpretation that appears very reasonable or expectable because of its compatibility with the 
encoded linguistic material, the frames that the audience will very likely activate or the 
implicated premises that they will supply. At a certain point, however, a completely unexpected, 
maybe incongruous, interpretation suddenly surfaces as plausible and puzzles the audience, 
who might have assigned plausibility to the initial interpretation (Attardo 1993, 2014). 
Awareness of that new interpretation and its plausibility would be possible thanks to that 
caution, which enables the audience to discover the ambivalence of the text and where the 
humourist’s wittiness and cunningness reside. 
Vigilance mechanisms could therefore be thought to include a specialised cluster of 
mechanisms targeting interpretative processes and their outputs, which might be located in the 
frontal lobes, more specifically in the LIFG. Those mechanisms would check if the 
interpretative hypotheses constructed are plausible and acceptable, and therefore allow the 
hearer to arrive at the intended message. Such a cluster of mechanisms would be sensitive to 
flaws in interpretative hypotheses, and hence to their implausibility and unacceptability. Their 
sensitivity to possible mistakes in any of the tasks of mutual parallel adjustment would 
safeguard hearers from misinterpretation. Since epistemic vigilance protects individuals from 
deception, the mechanisms protecting from misinterpretation could be said to enact a form of 
vigilance that could be labelled hermeneutical vigilance (Padilla Cruz 2014). It causes 
individuals to test the plausibility and acceptability of interpretations before finally regarding 
them as intended. This cluster of mechanisms would be an evolutionary response to the need to 
determine the plausibility of interpretative hypotheses prior to their final acceptance 
(Mazzarella 2013). 
 
5. Avenues for research 
Individuals tend to adopt a trustful attitude towards others and the information they convey, so 
they do not constantly check if their vigilance mechanisms work and fulfil their functions 
efficiently. Individuals rely on these mechanisms and only check if their level of activation is 
adequate when they feel some risk of deception (Origgi 2013: 224). The same would be true of 
the mechanisms assessing the accuracy of interpretative hypotheses: on average they would be 
moderately activated and individuals would be confident enough that they do their interpretive 
tasks appropriately. Individuals would only verify that these mechanisms actually work well 
when they perceive misunderstanding. Likewise, their level of activation could be raised if 
individuals are alerted to serious risks of misinterpretation. 
In argumentation, epistemic vigilance examines the validity, strength and coherence of claims 
and premises, and can detect fallacies and cases of deception (Mercier, Sperber 2011; Oswald 
2011). Relevance theorists have recently re-analysed some hearsay particles and adverbials, 
evidential adverbials, parenthetical clauses, past participles and quotatives in some languages 
as devices enacting the activation of epistemic vigilance. Such elements assist epistemic 
vigilance to determine whether to trust or discredit some information by indicating if the 
informer possesses adequate or enough evidence lending support to what is said (Ifantidou 
2001; Wilson 2012; Unger 2012; Padilla Cruz [forthcoming]). Quite similarly, hermeneutical 
vigilance mechanisms could be alerted to the possibility of misinterpretation, even if innocuous 
and merely intended for the sake of amusement and enjoyment, as in some forms of humour. 
Stress, intonation and paralanguage, which have been analysed as elements guiding the 
construction of higher-level explicatures about the speaker’s attitude to the proposition 
expressed (Wharton 2009), could also have evolved as a means to alert or over-activate 
mechanisms surveying interpretations and checking the correctness of interpretative 
hypotheses. It would therefore be insightful to investigate which tones or shifts in them, what 
types of gestures or facial expressions (e.g., sneers, gazes, winks, etc.) could serve this purpose 
in different languages and cultures.  
In humour, for instance, contextual elements about which individuals may possess 
encyclopaedic information (e.g., the type of programme individuals are watching/listening, the 
type of people featuring therein, etc.), the medium where a text appears (e.g., headline, 
advertisement, sitcom, etc.), the type of text (e.g., a canned joke, monologue, sketch, etc.), 
images or accompanying discourse (e.g., phrases such as “do you know the one…?”) could also 
be thought to alert hermeneutical vigilance mechanisms by signalling actual, potential or 
upcoming verbal playfulness. Additionally, textual features and elements unveiling the 
humorous nature of a text –lexical, semantic or syntactic ambiguities, metaphors, etc. (Attardo 
et al. 2011; Alvarado Ortega, Ruiz Gurillo 2012; Attardo 2014)– could similarly be argued to 
be exploited by hermeneutical vigilance mechanisms in order to assign plausibility to new 
interpretations. It would be interesting to chart which those elements are, whether they are used 
in specific humorous (sub-)genres, how they are perceived, their interrelation with other devices 
and, ultimately, their effects on the activation of vigilance mechanisms. 
Exercising vigilance is no doubt necessary to overcome or avoid misunderstanding at the 
explicit and implicit level of communication, as hearers may reach erroneous interpretations, 
which accidentally appear relevant (Wilson 1999), and believe them to have been intended 
(Padilla Cruz 2013a). The fact that other individuals appear not to be fully competent 
communicators due to ‘strange’ or deviant behaviours may induce some hearers to wrong them 
and forge unfortunate stereotypes. In social epistemology, such wronging is known as epistemic 
injustice (Fricker 2007). One of its sub-types is testimonial injustice, which arises when 
individuals think that others should not be credited because of the quality of the information 
they supply. Another sub-type is hermeneutical injustice, which originates when individuals 
are not understood as they expect or deserve (Fricker 2006). Low level of hermeneutical 
vigilance may explain why testimonial and hermeneutical injustices are perpetrated: they may 
originate as a consequence of not revising conclusions about other individuals and their claims, 
which are drawn as a result of using inadequate premises in inferential processes. Future 
investigations could elucidate if hermeneutical vigilance mechanisms are inhibited in specific 
communicative contexts or by factors such as lack of familiarity with idiosyncratic ways of 
speaking, differing patterns of thinking, social closeness or distance, or emotional or 
psychological states like sorrow, anger, illness, tiredness, absentmindedness, etc. (Mustajoki 
2012). 
Misunderstanding is germane to communication in a first language, but risk thereof may 
exponentially increase when communicating in a lingua franca (LF) or second language (L2) 
being learnt and not yet mastered. A small-scale qualitative study shows that not being vigilant 
enough led learners of Spanish and English at different proficiency levels to credit erroneous 
interpretations in a series of listening comprehension tasks. Not adopting a critical attitude 
towards the ways in which they assigned referents or disambiguated sentences, identified 
illocutionary force or derived implicit contents made them misunderstand their interlocutors or 
different texts (Padilla Cruz 2013b). If vigilance mechanisms are part of our genetically-
determined equipment, they perform their tasks regardless of the language used to 
communicate: individuals cannot prevent these mechanisms from performing their 
computations. However, since vigilance needs time to develop, it might also need fine-tuning 
to the peculiarities of an LF or L2. Researchers could also look into how it gets adapted to them, 
the amount of time adaptation requires and if instruction could help. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Ever since comprehension was described as a decoding activity, great progress has been made 
in unravelling its complexity and intricacies. Models from disciplines like theory of mind or 
philosophy of mind and empirical evidence from developmental psychology reveal that a series 
of sophisticated mental mechanisms are put to work when constructing interpretative 
hypotheses leading to understanding speaker’s meaning. While one of those modules performs 
inferences and another is responsible for belief or intention attribution, another determines 
whether to (dis)trust individuals and information. This work has argued that vigilance 
mechanisms may include a set of devices that scrutinise the adequacy and acceptability of 
interpretative hypotheses as a way to avoid misinterpretation. It has also suggested avenues for 
future research, which will certainly contribute to fuller insights into the factors influencing that 
series of mechanisms, how they work and, ultimately, how the mind behaves in comprehension. 
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